Captain Sully and justifiable defense

On January 15, 2009, a US Airways A320 experienced bird strikes one minute after takeoff, resulting in the failure of both engines and unsuccessful restart attempts. Captain Sully rejected air traffic control’s suggestion to make an emergency landing at a ground airport, deeming it unfeasible, and instead executed a successful unpowered ditching on the Hudson River in New York. The aircraft remained intact, and all 150 passengers and 5 crew members survived. This event became known as the Miracle on the Hudson, and Captain Sully became an American hero.
 

However, according to regulations, Captain Sully and his first officer were still required to be questioned by the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) to determine whether the crew made errors in handling the crisis, specifically whether it was necessary to risk a water landing. At the hearing, the NTSB, in collaboration with Airbus, demonstrated to attendees through computer simulations and two groups of pilots operating commercial flight simulators that the aircraft could have safely landed at a ground airport. Faced with such questioning, Captain Sully had the following exchange with the NTSB.

[4] Captain Sully: These simulations don't reflect real people, not real people encountering an emergency for the first time. After the bird strike, they immediately returned to the airport. They clearly knew the turns and headings in advance; they didn't take time to check, and they didn't activate the auxiliary power unit.

NTSB: They face exactly the same conditions as you do.

Captain Sully: No, because no one warned us. No one said, “You are going to have the lowest dual engine failure in history, but don’t worry, just turn left to some airport.” In the simulation, there was an exaggerated bank angle, and how many attempts did it take to successfully execute that turn? Those pilots are all excellent pilots, but in the simulation, you stripped away all humanity from the cockpit.

First Officer: This isn't a video game. This is life and death.

Captain Sully: Please find out how many simulated test flights were conducted.

NTSB: 17 times. It took 17 simulated test flights to successfully execute the emergency landing.

In the subsequent simulations, 35 seconds were subtracted, and all attempted ground landings failed.
 

The above dialogue provides a valuable reference for determining the conduct of the man in white in the Kunshan "counter-killing case." Self-defense is established based on human nature, but its constitutive requirements—or the red line of excessive defense—are designed by reason. The NTSB can, after the fact, use computer simulations and manual simulations to study and determine whether Captain Sully's handling was reasonable, but the public security organs, procuratorates, and courts cannot simulate whether the man in white in the "counter-killing case" had a better way—specifically, a way that would not constitute excessive defense—to ensure his personal safety. Even less would the public security organs, procuratorates, courts, or legal scholars open a God's-eye view and tell the man in white, "Don't be nervous. The few cuts you just made have already deprived him of the ability to harm you. His second run toward the car was to escape, not to get another knife or gun. Your lawful rights and interests are no longer under urgent, real threat."

Moreover, in the “counter-killing case,” the situation the man in white encountered was far worse than that of Captain Sully. Flying a plane was Captain Sully’s profession, and he had received emergency training (a powerless forced landing after a dual-engine failure at low altitude was not in the training manual). The man in white, however, had received no training on how to handle being attacked with a knife, still less could he be expected to flip through a few pages of a legal textbook on the spot to figure out the conditions for establishing justifiable defense, how to determine those conditions, and the consequences of violating them. Under such circumstances, any assessment of the man in white’s conduct must strip away all rationality and retain only the most basic humanity, even animality. The only thing the man in white could rely on at the time, and the only thing we can demand of him, was the basic survival instinct of a living being. One detail at the scene suffices to illustrate this point: after slashing the man in the BMW, the man in white kept gripping the steel knife tightly until the police arrived, only then did he let go.

Finally, let us conclude this article with a quote from Captain Sully: “You are looking for human error, then make it human.”