Just because he kept a Tibetan Mastiff, the dog owner had to pay over a million!

Compiled from: Huanqiu.com, Jufa
 
On August 24, the Shaoxing court disclosed the trial process of a personal injury compensation case. Ms. Zhou from Zhuji City, Zhejiang was so frightened by a Tibetan Mastiff owned by a neighbor in the same village that she rode her electric bike into a wall, resulting in a high-level spinal cord injury. She sued the dog owner Ding for compensation and won the court’s support. Ding is required to pay more than one million yuan for his negligent management.

 
 

Case review
On August 22, 2015, a woman surnamed Zhou was driving an electric tricycle from her home to the vegetable garden to pick vegetables, and she encountered Ding, her neighbor, who was letting a Tibetan mastiff roam by the roadside in front of Ding's house.
 
Zhou requested Ding to keep watch, but Ding did not take immediate action, confident that he could control the Tibetan mastiff and prevent it from harming anyone. As a result, when Zhou drove forward and passed by the Tibetan mastiff, his fear increased, causing a driving error that led him to crash into a utility pole, fall from the car, and get injured.
 
Zhou was successively sent to Zhuji People's Hospital and Zhuji Central Hospital for treatment, and was diagnosed with cervical spinal cord injury, high-level paraplegia, scalp laceration, and other conditions.
 
In addition, the Tibetan Mastiff was purchased by Xu, and after the purchase, it was raised by Ding; the two are father-in-law and son-in-law.
 

 
 

The court of first instance held
Focus of Dispute
1. Whether the defendant Ding's act of raising a Tibetan mastiff has a causal relationship with the plaintiff Zhou's injury;
2. Whether the defendant Xu needs to bear responsibility in this case.
 
About focus 1
Tibetan Mastiffs belong to a breed of dogs that are relatively large in size and have a rather fierce appearance. Generally speaking, even if they are kept in a cage, they can evoke fear in people, let alone being raised outdoors. Therefore, it is a normal psychological reaction for the plaintiff, Zhou, to feel fearful when seeing the Tibetan Mastiff being kept outside at that time. Thus, in this case, the manifestation of the harmful behavior of the Tibetan Mastiff should not be limited merely to attacking behaviors such as lunging, scratching, or biting, or intimidating sounds like barking or baring teeth. Rather, it is the inherent danger of the Tibetan Mastiff itself, combined with the circumstances of there being no restraint measures at the time, that is enough to evoke fear, which led to the plaintiff, Zhou, falling from the car due to a driving error. Therefore, there is a causal relationship between the behavior of the defendant, Ding, in raising the Tibetan Mastiff and the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, Zhou.
 
 
About focus 2
The Tibetan mastiff was purchased by the defendant Xu, and it should generally be recognized that the defendant Xu is the owner of the Tibetan mastiff. After the purchase, it was raised by the defendant Ding. Moreover, the two defendants are in a father-in-law and son-in-law relationship, so it can be recognized that the two defendants are jointly raising the Tibetan mastiff. Although the defendant Ding claims to be the owner and unrelated to the defendant Xu, considering the facts of this case, this court finds it difficult to believe. Therefore, the defendant Xu should bear joint compensation in this case.
 
The citizen's right to physical health is protected by law. The Tibetan Mastiffs raised by the two defendants caused injuries to the plaintiff, Zhou, which is a clear fact, supported by conclusive evidence. The two defendants should bear compensation responsibility for the plaintiff's reasonable economic losses. Before the accident occurred, the plaintiff was already aware of the danger of the Tibetan Mastiffs, yet still chose to ride past them, and did not take certain safety precautions while riding. Therefore, the plaintiff bears some fault for the occurrence of the accident and should also assume partial responsibility. The court, at its discretion, determines that the plaintiff, Zhou, shall bear 30% of the responsibility, and the two defendants shall bear 70% of the responsibility.
 
Accordingly, pursuant to Articles 6, 16, and 26 of the Tort Liability Law of the People's Republic of China, it is adjudged: 1. Defendants Ding and Xu shall jointly compensate plaintiff Zhou for medical expenses, nursing fees (including dependency nursing fees), lost wages, nutrition expenses, disability compensation, mental distress compensation, transportation fees, appraisal fees, and other economic losses totaling 1,163,050.78 yuan, to be paid in full within fifteen days from the effective date of this judgment; 2. The remaining claims of plaintiff Zhou are dismissed.
 
 
The appellant claims
Revoke the first-instance judgment and either send it back for retrial or modify the judgment to dismiss the appellee's claims against the appellant.
 
Facts and Reasons
1. The act of Ding raising animals has absolutely no causal relationship with the occurrence of the damage caused to Zhou.
According to Article 78 of the Tort Liability Law, if an animal raised causes damage to others, the animal keeper or manager shall bear tort liability. The key focus of this case is whether Zhou's injury was caused by Ding's Tibetan mastiff and whether there is a causal relationship between them. What is a causal relationship? It means that the occurrence of the damage is the inevitable result caused by the harmful act. There is direct inevitability between the harmful act and the damage result, not a presumption. Both the harmful act and the damage result should objectively exist. After the first-instance trial, it is clear that Zhou's injury was not caused by the Tibetan mastiff raised by Ding inflicting harm. At that time, the mastiff itself did not exhibit any behavior indicating an intent to harm Zhou.
 
Moreover, at that time, it was not the "no restraining measures at that time" as determined in the first-instance judgment, and Ding had been watching nearby all along. During the first-instance trial, Zhou repeatedly emphasized that the driving mistake was caused by "fear." It should be noted that "fear" itself is a psychological state, not a legal fact. An accident caused by abnormal behavior due to psychological influence is entirely a personal action. A person's mental state cannot be predicted by others, let alone controlled. At that time, there were far more passersby than just Zhou, but only Zhou had an accident. This alone is enough to show that Ding's act of raising animals has no causal relationship with the occurrence of Zhou's injury. The first-instance judgment's claim that the situation at that time was "intimidating" is unfounded. There is no evidence to prove whether Zhou experienced "fear" at the time, yet the first-instance judgment simply concluded that there was a causal relationship between Ding raising a Tibetan mastiff and Zhou's injury, which has no legal basis.
 
2. The trial court's finding that Ding and Xu are jointly liable for compensation lacks factual basis.
In fact, the Tibetan Mastiff in this case was raised by Ding, while the plaintiff claimed that it was being fostered by Xu at Ding's place, but provided no evidence to support this. The first-instance judgment held that the Tibetan Mastiff was purchased by Xu, who should generally be recognized as the owner. Regarding Ding's defense that he is the owner of the Tibetan Mastiff, the court dismissed it simply and bluntly by saying 'considering the actual situation of this case, this court finds it difficult to accept,' which violates the legal principle of 'whoever makes a claim bears the burden of proof' under civil procedure law.
 
3. The first-instance judgment supporting Zhou's claim for compensation according to the urban resident compensation standard has no factual basis.
To support compensation based on the urban resident standards, Zhou provided a certificate issued by Zhuji Huangshan Agricultural Trade Market Co., Ltd., as well as an individual business registration certificate. However, the individual business registration does not belong to Zhou himself, and the scope of business is completely different from what Zhou claimed regarding vegetable trading. The agricultural trade market is not qualified to issue the relevant certificate. Furthermore, the market certificate only indicates that Zhou set up a stall to sell vegetables at the agricultural market, but it does not specify the exact location of the stall. Therefore, the compensation standard for Zhou's injury should refer to his household registration type, that is, the compensation standard for rural residents.
 
4. In addition to Zhou's own driving mistakes, another important reason for his injury was that after his vehicle lost control and hit a roadside utility pole, the impact caused him to fall and get injured.
After an on-site inspection, the appellee believed that the placement of the utility pole was obviously inappropriate. If there had been no utility pole, even if Mr. Zhou had made a driving error, it would not have resulted in injury. Therefore, the appellant applied to add the owner or manager of the utility pole as a defendant, but the first instance court did not approve it, which was improper.
 
 
The appellate court holds
1 , regarding whether Ding's act of raising animals has a causal relationship with Zhou's injury.
According to the ascertained facts, Zhou was driving an electric tricycle past Ding's house when he encountered Ding raising a Tibetan mastiff by the roadside. Seeing this, Zhou immediately felt fear and thus asked Ding to take control of the dog. Ding did not take immediate action, confident that he could watch the Tibetan mastiff and prevent it from harming anyone. Zhou then continued driving, and as he passed by the mastiff, his fear intensified, resulting in a driving error that caused him to fall from the vehicle and get injured.
 
The court believes that Tibetan Mastiffs are large in size and have a rather fierce appearance. When allowed to roam outdoors, they do indeed cause fear. At the time of the accident in this case, the involved Tibetan Mastiff was unrestrained. The trial court considered that the dog was the reason Zhou fell from the car due to a driving error, and saw no impropriety in this conclusion.
 
2 Regarding whether Xu should bear compensation liability in this case.
After the accident occurred, Ding stated to the public security authorities and during the first-instance trial that the Tibetan mastiff involved in the case was purchased by Xu. The evidence provided by the appellant in the second-instance trial was insufficient to overturn this statement. The first-instance court thus considered it appropriate to recognize Xu as the owner of the Tibetan mastiff. Considering that at the time of the accident the Tibetan mastiff was actually raised by Ding, and that Ding and Xu have a father-in-law and son-in-law relationship, it was also proper for the first-instance court to identify Ding and Xu as co-keepers of the Tibetan mastiff. Therefore, Xu should bear joint liability for compensation.
 
3 Regarding whether Zhou can receive compensation according to the urban resident standard.
According to the certificate issued by Zhuji City Huangshan Agricultural Trade Market Co., Ltd. and the basic registration information of the individual business provided by Zhou in the first-instance trial, combined with the situation verified after the first-instance trial, it is true that Zhou was engaged in selling vegetables at a stall. Therefore, the first-instance court believed that Zhou's main source of income was non-agricultural income, and it was lawful and justified to calculate his corresponding compensation according to the urban resident standard.
 
4 Regarding whether the owner or manager of the utility pole should be added as a defendant in this case.
Ding and Xu did not provide evidence to prove a causal relationship between the utility pole and Zhou's injury. Therefore, the first-instance court's refusal to approve their request to add the owner or manager of the utility pole as a defendant in this case was not improper.
 
In summary, the appeal requests of appellants Ding and Xu cannot be established and should be dismissed; the facts recognized in the first-instance judgment are clear, and the law was applied correctly, and the judgment should be upheld.
 
 
[1] The author's perspective
It is not difficult to see that both the trial court and the appellate court reached consistent judgments on the two key points of this case, namely: first, there is a causal relationship between Ding's raising of the Tibetan mastiff and Zhou's injury; second, Xu purchased the Tibetan mastiff, Ding was responsible for raising it, and Xu and Ding are in a father-in-law and son-in-law relationship, therefore Xu and Ding bear joint liability for compensation.
 
I do not entirely agree with the court's judgment on these two points for the following reasons:
 
1. The compensation borne by Ding and Xu exceeded the scope they should bear.
First, although Tibetan Mastiffs do belong to fierce dog breeds, they are large in size and have a fierce appearance, the jurisdiction where the incident occurred has not issued regulations banning the keeping of fierce dogs. In other words, Ding's act of keeping a Tibetan Mastiff in the rural area is legal and reasonable.
 
Second, at that time, Ding, as the owner of the Tibetan Mastiff, did not use a leash to restrain this fierce dog, which caused Ms. Zhou to become increasingly fearful while passing by on her bicycle, leading to the accident. Therefore, it can be seen that Ms. Zhou's heightened fear while passing by is somewhat related to the Tibetan Mastiff not being leashed. Furthermore, it is normal for a Tibetan Mastiff to naturally induce fear in people. The author believes that Ding bears responsibility in this situation.
 
Third, at that time the Tibetan mastiff did not make any move towards Ms. Zhou, including approaching or barking, yet Ms. Zhou still had an accident while riding her bike. The fundamental reason was Ms. Zhou's own inner fear, not any behavior of the Tibetan mastiff. Therefore, if the owner of the Tibetan mastiff is judged to bear 70% of the responsibility and pay over one million yuan merely because the dog was present and not leashed, I believe such a judgment exceeds the compensation responsibility they should bear.
 
 
2. Xu should not bear compensation liability as the purchaser of the Tibetan mastiff.
The court's reasoning for holding Xu jointly liable for compensation is: first, Xu is the purchaser of the Tibetan mastiff; second, Xu and Ding have a father-in-law and son-in-law relationship.
 
The author believes that the criterion for determining whether Xu bears compensation responsibility in this case should be whether Xu is the actual keeper of the Tibetan mastiff. If so, Xu has the same custodial obligations as Ding; if not, Xu's role is merely that of a purchaser and should not be considered a cause of Ms. Zhou's accident. It's akin to a son-in-law who simply buys a kitchen knife for home use, and the father-in-law uses it to kill someone—can one say that the victim's death is related to the son-in-law buying the knife?
 
According to the judgment of the second-instance court, it can be seen that the Tibetan Mastiff was actually raised by Ding. Neither the first-instance judgment nor the second-instance judgment stated that Xu also participated in the actual raising process. Therefore, Xu cannot be held liable for compensation solely because of his purchase and his relationship as Ding's son-in-law.
 
 
最后, now many places across the country, such as Beijing, Shenzhen, and Kunming, have explicitly stipulated bans on raising fierce dogs in residential areas, commercial areas, industrial areas, and other prohibited areas designated by the authorities. The Tort Liability section of the Civil Code, which will take effect next year, also establishes a special chapter clearly titled 'Liability for Damage Caused by Animals.' I would like to take this opportunity to remind everyone to properly supervise their pets; providing convenience to others is also a way of being responsible for oneself.